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The present research examined the influence of perceived ownership (self/other) and
perceived chooser (self/other) of stocks on brain activity, and investigated whether
differential brain responses to stock outcomes as a result of perceived differences in
ownership of stock would be modulated by perceived chooser of stock. We used a
2 (stock chooser: self, other) × 2 (stock owner: self, other) within-subject design to
represent four types of chooser-owner relationships. Brain potentials were recorded
while participants observed increasing and decreasing stock prices. Results showed
that observations of stock outcomes among four types of chooser-owner relationships
elicited differentiated feedback-related negativity (d-FRN: differences in FRN waves
between losses and gains, reflecting violations of expectancy to stock outcomes):
(1) Self-chosen-other-owned stocks evoked significantly larger d-FRN discrepancies
than self-chosen-self-owned stocks, indicating a greater expectancy violation to others’
losses than to one’s own, demonstrating a reversed ownership effect. Moreover, people
high in conscientiousness showed an increase in this trend, suggesting a stronger
other-consideration; (2) Self-chosen-self-owned stocks and other-chosen-self-owned
stocks revealed no significant d-FRN discrepancy, showing no choosership effect
beyond the ownership effect; (3) Other-chosen-self-owned stocks evoked a significantly
stronger d-FRN discrepancy than other-chosen-other-owned stocks, demonstrating an
ownership effect; (4) Self-chosen-other-owned stocks evoked a significantly stronger
d-FRN discrepancy than other-chosen-other-owned stocks, revealing a choosership
effect. These findings suggest that the ownership effect could be reversed by
conscientiousness induced by perceived choosership in the agency relationship, while
the choosership effect is attenuated and even disappears under the influence of
perceived ownership.
Keywords: behavioral social neuro-finance, choosership effect, ownership effect, choice effect, feedback-related
negativity (FRN), emotion, responsibility, neural economics
INTRODUCTION
People may take on diverse financial roles in the stock market: observers, buyers, fund managers,
or clients. These four roles can be classified according to two categories: ownership (the individual
who owns the stock) and choosership (the individual who selected the stock). The roles concerning
ownership (self-owned stocks vs. other-owned stocks) and the roles concerning choosership
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(self-chosen stocks vs. other-chosen stocks) are combined
to create four chooser-owner relationships. Intriguingly,
people may take on all four financial roles simultaneously.
How ownership and choosership of stocks individually and
interactively influence brain activities while observing stock
outcomes (gains or losses) across the four roles remains unclear.
The present study aimed to investigate the individual and
interactive influence of perceived ownership and perceived
choosership of stocks on stock outcome evaluations.
It has been found that ownership and choosership are two
factors that influence preference of objects (Huang et al., 2009).
People tend to prefer their own possessions to those they do
not own, a phenomenon termed ownership effect (Beggan, 1992;
Nesselroade et al., 1999). The choosership effect, which is known
as the post-decisional spreading of alternatives, reveals that for
the two self-own objects (one self-chosen and one other-chosen),
people would more like the self-chosen one rather than the other-
chosen one, even if the choosership is only imagined (Huang
et al., 2009).
Ownership effect is the tendency to overvalue self-owned
possessions to maintain a positive self-image due to a self-
enhancement motivation (Belk, 1988; Beggan, 1992; Nesselroade
et al., 1999). This bias can appear in various social-cultural
contexts. An example lies in the favorable evaluation of
objects, where ownership has been hypothesized to increase
the attractiveness of objects (Heider, 1958). This effect has
been observed with participants rating their own objects more
favorably than others’ objects, both in studies where there was
actual ownership of objects (Beggan, 1992; Nesselroade et al.,
1999), and also in studies without real ownership (Sen and
Johnson, 1997; DeDreu and vanKnippenberg, 2005; Huang et al.,
2009).
The effect of choosership on outcome evaluation has been
studied extensively over several decades and has been deemed
as both desirable and powerful (Iyengar and Lepper, 1999).
When people choose between two alternatives that are similarly
attractive, they evaluate the chosen alternative substantially more
positively than the other options, so as to reassert their autonomy
(Brehm, 1966). As for object evaluation, like object preference,
a choosership effect has been proposed and termed as the
phenomenon where choosership itself is powerful enough to
induce liking, even in the condition where choosing is an illusion
and does not actually occur (Huang et al., 2009). However, unlike
in object evaluations where objects often hold neutral valence, the
effect of choosership on distinctive positive (gains) and negative
(losses) outcomes has seldom been studied under an imagined
condition without real choice processes.
The present research aimed to study the influence of
perceived ownership and perceived choosership on stock
outcome evaluations by recording brain activities, and also
investigate whether differences in brain activity as a response to
differential ownership would be modulated by choosership. To
this end, we investigated the individual and interactive influence
of perceived ownership and perceived choosership on stock
outcome evaluations by developing a 2 (stock chooser: self,
other) × 2 (stock owner: self, other) × 2 (stock outcome: gain,
loss) within-subject design. By doing so, we developed a special
situation that combines both the owner (self-owned stock vs.
other-owned stock) and the chooser (self-chosen stock vs. other-
chosen stock) to mimic four financial roles in the stock market.
Each role represents one of four financial roles: (1) a buyer,
who purchases a stock that he has chosen for himself (or self-
chosen, self-owned stock, abbreviated as SCSO), acting as an
independent individual investor; (2) a broker, who is involved
with a stock that he has chosen for another individual (or self-
chosen, other-owned stock, SCOO), acting as an agent (e.g., fund
manager) who selects stocks for clients but does not own the
stocks; (3) a client, involved in a stock chosen by an agent (or
other-chosen, self-owned stock, OCSO), acting as a fund holder
who owns the stocks but delegates the selection of stocks to
other people; (4) an observer, involved in a stock that another
person chooses for him/herself (or other-chosen, other-owned
stock, OCOO), acting as an onlooker or observer. As for outcome
comparison, we compared two of the four financial roles each
time. We further compared the outcome evaluation of each pair
of financial roles and inferred the possible emotional differences
in each comparison group.
When applying electrophysiological methods, converging
evidence implies that feedback related negativity responses
(FRNs) reflects the neural mechanisms underlying the evaluation
of one’s own losses and gains (Yeung and Sanfey, 2004; Hajcak
et al., 2005, 2007; Sato et al., 2005; Toyomaki and Murohashi,
2005; Yeung et al., 2005; Yu et al., 2007; Luu et al., 2009). FRN
is elicited by the incongruity between an actual outcome (e.g.,
monetary losses) and an initial expectancy (e.g., monetary gains),
reflecting the expectancy violation in outcome evaluation tasks
(Yu and Zhou, 2006; Itagaki and Katayama, 2008; Kang et al.,
2010; Leng and Zhou, 2010; Marco-Pallarés et al., 2010; Ma
et al., 2011). FRN is distributed over the fronto-central recording
sites and reaches a maximum at ∼200–300ms after the onset
of the outcome feedback. FRN is more pronounced for negative
feedback associated with unfavorable outcomes, such as incorrect
responses or monetary losses, than for positive feedback (Miltner
et al., 1997; Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Müller et al., 2005;
Yu and Zhou, 2009). More specifically, FRN reflects a fast good–
bad evaluation of feedback, with its amplitude depending on
the relationship between the actual and the expected outcomes
(Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004). In addition,
Gehring and Willoughby (2002) argued that FRN (referred to as
the MFN) reflects an evaluation of the affective or motivational
significance of errors detected by cognitive monitoring processes.
This suggests that we can use FRN to speculate on the emotional
intensity that may be hidden behind an outcome evaluation.
Additionally, to minimize the effects of overlap of FRN with
negative ERP components, we calculated the difference of FRN
waveforms by subtracting the ERPs elicited by gain from the ERPs
elicited by loss, following the methods of Holroyd and Krigolson
(2007), and termed the FRN difference between losses and gains
d-FRN.
The current research aimed to investigate how individuals
respond to financial outcomes in different person-stock
relationships. We proposed a new scenario-simulation paradigm
to assign four financial roles by priming both ownership and
choosership, which can compare the processing of outcome
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evaluation reflected by FRN when assigned to each of the four
different roles. We focused on a financial context in which the
“other” and the “self ” are not simply friends or strangers; instead,
they are bound together by profit-based relationships. This helps
further understand the functional significance of FRN involved
across multiple financial roles, and by doing so, contributes to
the new research area of social-neuro-finance.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
A total of 22 healthy students (9 males, 13 females; mean age ±
SD = 21.40 ± 1.73 years) from different universities voluntarily
participated in the study. All participants were right-handed
with normal or corrected-to-normal vision. No participants with
chronic diseases, mental disorders, medication, or those smoked
or abused alcohol were recruited for the experiment.
The experiment was conducted in accordance with The Code
of Ethics of the World Medical Association (Declaration of
Helsinki). Participants were given written instructions before the
experiment began. Each participant knew that at the end of the
experiment, they would be reimbursed for their time with US
$15. We used a fixed payment since subjects didn’t make any
operations that changed the results in stock exchange.
Design and Procedures
The experiment adopted a 2 × 2 × 2 within-subjects design,
with the choosership of the stocks (self-chosen, other-chosen),
the ownership of the stocks (self-owned, other-owned), and the
stock outcome (gain, loss) as the three within-subject factors.
We used the combination of choosership and ownership to
set up four person-stock relationships in which participants
played four financial roles. In the four person-stock relationships,
the corresponding four types of stocks were named A/B/X/Y
(shown in Figure 1). We asked participants to view ratios of
stock price change (e.g., rise or fall with a 3, 6, and 9% ratio)
and then asked them to recall whether the stocks belonged to
the self (the participants themselves) or the other, and whether
the stocks were chosen by the self or the other. Participants’
event-related potentials (ERPs) evoked by the presentation of the
outcome (i.e., the rise and fall of stocks) were recorded while they
occupied different financial roles. It is worth noting that in the
present research, the paradigm allowed participants to experience
different roles across trials within one session.
Participants were told that the experiment consisted of three
parts: a practice task, a main experiment task, and a questionnaire
task. In the practice part, participants completed a 5-min training
session prior to the main experiment. After the main experiment,
participants were asked to report their feelings.
In the main experiment task, participants read the following
two-page scenarios on paper:
(Page 1)
Welcome to this experiment!
Please visualize the following scenario carefully and answer the
following questions:
Recently people pay more and more attention to financial
investment and want to gain more profits. There are different types
of financial products, such as stocks, funds, bonds etc. High return
always comes with high risk.
Please imagine the following scenes when you buy a financial
product:
Financial role 1: You choose 3 stocks in the stock market and
have decided to buy them.
Denote them as A1, A2, and A3.
Remember that you made the decision for yourself and bought
them by yourself.
Financial role 2: Someone named Wang wanted you to help
choose some stocks. You chose 3 stocks for him to buy.
Denote the 3 stocks as B1, B2, and B3.
Remember that you made the decision for Wang and he bought
(and owned) the stocks.
Financial role 3: You asked someone named Li to choose 3 stocks
for you. Then you bought the stocks.
Denote them as X1, X2, and X3.
Remember that Li made the decision for you and you bought
(owned) the stocks.
Financial role 4: Someone named Zhang chooses 3 stocks and
bought them by him/herself (in accordance with the participant’s
gender).
Denote them as Y1, Y2, and Y3.
Remember that Zhang made the decision and bought (owned)
the stocks him/herself.
Note: The initial investments are all 100,000 dollars. People who
buy the stocks will suffer from the loss or profit from the gain.
Please take 2min to remember these codes for stocks in the four
scenarios. They will be used in the following experiment.
Please answer the following questions:
1. The codes of stocks, which you made the decision about and
you bought, are:
___ __ ___
2. The codes of stocks, which you made the decision about and
another person bought, are:
___ __ ___
3. The codes of stocks, which another person made the decision
about and they bought, are:
___ __ ___
4. The codes of stocks, which another person made the decision
about and you bought, are:
___ __ ___
(Page2)
To make sure that the participants had memorized which stocks
belonged to them and which to the “other,” they were asked to
write down on a blank paper the stocks’ names in each scenario
before the EEG recording. Altogether, there were 12 stocks (A1,
A2, A3, B1, B2, B3, X1, X2, X3, Y1, Y2, Y3) divided into four
person-stock relationships. For control purposes, participants
were further instructed that all stocks started at the same price.
Each trial began with the presentation of a fixation cross at
the center of the screen for 500ms against a black background.
Then the name of one of the twelve memorized stocks (e.g., A1)
was presented for 1000ms. During the experiment, we asked
participants to view ratios of stock price changes. After a jittered
blank interval of 200, 300, or 400ms, a ratio of stock rose or
declined by 3, 6, or 9% (white and Song font, size 32) could
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FIGURE 1 | Sequence of events in a single trial. Each trial began with the
presentation of a fixation cross at the center of the screen for 500ms against a
black background. Then the stock name of one of the twelve memorized
stocks (e.g., A1) was presented for 1000ms. After a jittered blank interval of
200, 300, or 400ms, a ratio of stock price increase or decrease by 3, 6, or 9%
(white and Song font, size 32) was presented to indicate the movement of
stock price. The ratio was presented for 800ms. Participants’ EEG signals
from −200 to 800ms of this screen were extracted for analyses. The ratio was
followed by another jittered blank interval of 200, 300, or 400ms. At the end of
each trial, one of the following two questions, “Who chose the stock (A1),” or
“Who owns the stock (A1)” appeared as the “question” screen. The two
answer options: the “self” and the “other” (in words), was randomly presented
on the left or right side of the “question” screen. The participants were asked
to judge the owner or the chooser of the stock by pressing a corresponding
key (n, m) as quickly as possible within 2 s. The “question” screen did not
disappear until participants responded. The last screen in the trial was blank
and lasted for 500ms.
be used to describe the change of previous stocks. The ratio
was presented for 800ms. Participants’ EEG signals from −200
to 800ms of this screen were extracted for analyses. The ratio
was followed by another jittered blank interval of 200, 300, or
400ms. We then asked them to state whether the stocks belonged
to themselves or to the other and whether they had chosen the
stocks themselves or if they were chosen by the other. At the end
of each trial, one of the following two questions, “Who chose
the stock (A1),” or “Who owned the stock (A1)” appeared as
the “question” screen. The two answer options: the “self ” and
the “other” (in words), were randomly presented on the left or
right side of the “question” screen. The participants were asked
to judge the owner or the chooser of the stock by pressing a
corresponding key (n, m) as quickly as possible within 2 s. The
“question” screen did not disappear until participants responded.
The last screen in the trial is a blank and lasted for 500ms (see
Figure 1 for procedural details).
The participant was seated comfortably about 1m in front
of a computer screen in a dimly lit and electromagnetically
shielded room. The experiment was administered on an Intel(R)
Core(TM) i7-3770 CPU computer with a Del 24-in. CRT display,
using Presentation software (Neurobehavioral System Inc.) to
control the presentation and timing of stimuli. Participants
completed a 5-min training session prior to the commencement
of the main experiment. After that, each participant received
4 blocks of 696 trials, with each of the 2 (stock chooser: self,
other) × 2(stock owner: self, other) × 2(stock outcome: rise,
fall) 8 experimental conditions concludes 87 trials (39 trials for
3 and 9% ratio and 9 trials for 6%). We introduced this design
with various stock price change ratios to simulate realistic stock
market fluctuations as well as avoiding subjects’ desensitization to
experimental stimuli. The order of the trials was counterbalanced
across 4 blocks using M-sequences (Buracas and Boynton, 2002).
These are pseudo random sequences that have the advantage of
being perfectly counterbalanced n trials back, so that each type
of trial was preceded and followed equally frequently by all 8
types of trials, including itself. Because M-sequences have the
advantage that each type of trial will be preceded and followed
equally frequently by all types of trials, the negligible history effect
is removed by this averaging procedure (Buracas and Boynton,
2002). Each of the eight conditions contained dozens of trials,
and the brain responses were averaged by those trials for each
condition. In addition, there were 48 trials in which the stocks
were not preceded by any ratios. These trials were used as
fillers to control for possible response strategies. The 696 trials
were randomly sequenced for each participant. Participants were
provided with a 5-min break mid-session between 4 blocks.
After the main experiment task, participants completed a 40-
item mini-marker scale of Big-Five Personality trait (Saucier,
1994), which comprises five factors (extraversion, agreeableness,
conscientiousness, emotional stability, and openness). This is a
widely used measure of Big-Five Personality trait, particularly
because it is short and can be easily used in experimental settings.
The Cronbach’s α of the Big-Five personality trait test ranged
from 0.79 to 0.90 of the five factors sub-scale in this study. We
used the five personality traits to investigate the relationship
between behavioral and neural evidence. Participants also
completed a 7-item perspective-taking questionnaire taken from
Davis’s subscale of interpersonal reactivity index (IRI) (Davis,
1980). The Cronbach’s α was 0.68 in this study.
EEG Data Acquisition
EEGs were recorded from 32 scalp sites using tin electrodes
mounted in an elastic cap (Brain Products, Munich, Germany)
according to the international 10–20 systems. The vertical
electrooculogram (VEOG) was recorded supra-orbitally from
the right eye. The horizontal EOG (HEOG) was recorded from
electrodes placed at the outer canthus of left eye. All EEGs and
EOGs were referenced online to an external electrode that was
placed on the tip of nose and were re-referenced oﬄine to the
mean of the left and right mastoids. All electrode impedance
was kept below 5 k. The bio-signals were amplified with a
band pass from 0.016 to 100Hz and digitized on-line with a
sampling frequency of 1000Hz. EEG epochs of 1200ms (with
a 200-ms pre-stimulus baseline) were extracted oﬄine for ERPs
time-locked to the onset of the ratio of the stocks. Ocular artifacts
were corrected with an eye-movement correction algorithm,
which employs a regression analysis in combination with artifact
averaging (Semlitsch et al., 1986).
EEG Data Analysis
The EEG and EOG data were analyzed off-line using the Brain
Vision Analyzer Software Package (Brain Products, Munich,
Germany). All data were re-referenced off-line to the mean
of the left and right mastoids. Ocular artifacts were corrected
with an eye-movement correction algorithm (Semlitsch et al.,
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 January 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 8
Shang et al. Ownership, Choice, and FRN to Stock Outcomes
1986). The signal was filtered off-line using a band-pass of 0.1–
30Hz. Artifacts with potentials exceeding ±80µV was rejected.
Subsequently, epochs that ranged from−200 to+800ms relative
to the ratio of stock onset were extracted and normalized (by
subtraction) to a 200ms pre-cue onset baseline.
The ERP component analyzed in the current experiment is the
FRN. Based on visual inspection of the ERP waveforms (Figure 2
shows FRN on sites F3, F4, Cz, Fz), mean amplitudes for the
ERPs in the 320–420ms window (FRN) were computed for the 8
experimental conditions, with each condition having on average
80–83 trails (ranging from 72 to 87 trials for each participant).
The EEG epochs were averaged separately for 2 (stock chooser:
self, other) × 2 (stock owner: self, other) × 2 (stock outcome:
gain, loss) conditions (SCSO gain, SCSO loss, SCOO gain, SCOO
loss, OCSO gain, OCSO loss, OCOO gain, and OCOO loss).
Additionally, to minimize the overlap of FRN with negative
ERP components, we calculated the difference of FRNwaveforms
by subtracting the ERPs elicited by the gain trials from the ERPs
elicited by loss trials in the 340–420ms time window, following
the methods of Holroyd and Krigolson (2007). We refer to
the FRN difference effect between loss and gain as d-FRN. We
calculated d-FRN for each of the four kinds of stocks separately
when participants assumed each financial role: 2 (stock chooser:
self, other)× 2 (stock owner: self, other).
This FRN difference effects (d-FRN) was defined as the
mean value of the most negative component distributed on the
anterior scalp over 320–420ms in the experiments. We selected
10 electrodes of F3, F4, FC1, FC2, Fz, Cz, C3, C4, CP1, and
CP2 in frontal area for FRN and d-FRN in statistical analysis
(see Figure 2). These electrodes were chosen based on previous
research that found FRN to be maximized at the fronto-central
midline (Yeung et al., 2005; Hewig et al., 2007; Jia et al., 2007; Li
et al., 2009). The average amplitudemeasure was adopted because
it can reduce noise fluctuations compared with the base-to-peak
approach, which is relatively insensitive to positive deflections
in the time range of the FRN (Yeung et al., 2005; Cohen and
Ranganath, 2007).
A three way repeated measures of analysis of variance
(ANOVA) on the amplitude of d-FRN component was conducted
with stock chooser (self, other), stock owner (self, other), and
electrode position (10 electrodes: F3, F4, FC1, FC2, Fz, Cz, C3,
C4, CP1, and CP2).
In addition, we averaged ERPs on the above-mentioned 10
electrodes in conjuction, taking the 10 electrodes as the anterior
scalp area. A 2 × 2 × 2 mixed ANOVA on the selected 10
electrodes for FRN was performed, the three factors were: stock
chooser (self, other), stock owner (self, other), and valence (gain,
loss).
The computer program SPSS (version 20.0) was used. The
Greenhouse–Geisser correction for violation of the assumption
of sphericity was applied where appropriate.
RESULTS
Behavioral Results
Trials in which the participants did not respond within 2 s or
responded incorrectly and trials in which the reaction times
(RTs) exceeded three standard deviations from the mean in
each experimental condition were excluded from data analysis.
Approximately 1.00% of the total data points were lost due to
these exclusions.
We conducted a 2 (stock chooser: self, other) × 2 (stock
owner: self, other)× 2 (stock outcome: gain, loss) mixed ANOVA
on the RTs. The means of RTs showed in Figure 3. The ANOVA
table for RT results is shown in Table 1.
Results revealed a significant main effect of ownership,
F(1, 21) = 15.91, p= 0.001, η
2 partial= 0.431, suggesting that the
responses to self-owned stocks (mean ± SE, 681.64 ± 39.82ms)
were significantly faster than responses to other-owned stocks
(772.43± 37.07ms). Additionally, there was a reliable main effect
of stock outcome, F(1, 21) = 10.48, p = 0.004, η
2 partial = 0.333,
with the responses to the gain outcome (mean ± SE, 719.93 ±
35.84ms) significantly faster than that to the loss outcome (mean
± SE, 734.14± 37.76ms). There was no significant main effect of
stock chooser and no interaction effect among the three factors
(stock chooser, stock owner, and stock outcome). Although,
the behavioral responses lagged behind the presentation of
the stimuli in our paradigm, this finding is explained by the
ownership effect and is consistent with previous studies showing
that individuals generally respond faster to self-related items such
as one’s own name, phone number, or face photos (Greenwald
and Farnham, 2000; Ma and Han, 2010). The negative stimuli
representing a monetary loss (stock fall) attracted participants’
attention and made participants respond slower, and it was more
difficult for individuals to shift their attention to the next stimuli
responses for the stock-owner/chooser judgment. This finding
was consistent with the argument of increased expectancy, as
the delayed reaction time may reflect the detection of conflict
between expectancy and the actual outcome, irrespective of what
attribute the expectancy is built upon (e.g., Wu and Zhou, 2009).
ERP Results
Based on visual inspection of the ERP waveforms (Figure 2), we
analyzed the mean amplitude of the 320–420ms time window
after the onset of the stock outcomes. Based on previous research
that found FRN to be maximized at the fronto-central midline
(Yeung et al., 2005; Hewig et al., 2007; Jia et al., 2007; Li et al.,
2009), we selected 10 electrodes, F3, F4, FC1, FC2, Fz, Cz, C3,
C4, CP1, and CP2, in the frontal area for the FRN and d-FRN for
assessment in the statistical analysis (see Figure 2).
It is clear from Figures 2, 4 that the choosership (self, other)
altered the differential effect of the FRN between the ERP
responses to the loss vs. gain outcomes of other-owned stocks
but not for the self-owned stocks. Detailed statistical analyses
confirmed this observation.
ANOVA with stock chooser (self, other), stock owner (self,
other), valence of the stock outcomes (rise, fall), and the electrode
(F3, F4, FC1, FC2, Fz, Cz, C3, C4, CP1, and CP2) yielded
a significant three-way interaction between the stock chooser,
ownership of the stocks, and the valence of the outcome,
F(1, 21) = 14.78, p = 0.001, η
2 partial = 0.413. The four-way
interaction between the stock chooser, ownership of the stocks,
the valence of the outcome, and the electrode was not significant,
F(1, 21) = 1.74, p = 0.147, η
2 partial= 0.077.
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FIGURE 2 | Grand-averaged ERP waveforms from channel Fz, Cz, F3, F4 at the middle-frontal area as a function of stock types when playing different
financial roles (self-chosen-self-owned, self-chosen-other-owned, other-chosen-self-owned, other-chosen-other-owned) and valence (gains and
losses) of feedback outcomes, time-locked to the onset of stocks’ outcome in the self-chosen group (left panel), and other-chosen group (right panel).
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FIGURE 3 | Means of the RTs to the stock outcome (gains and losses)
when playing the four different financial roles. The error bars denote 1 SE
across subjects for each condition.
TABLE 1 | The ANOVA for RT results.
F p η2 partial
Choosership 3.195 0.088 0.132
Ownership 15.908 0.001 0.431
Outcome (gain, loss) 10.482 0.004 0.333
Choosership * ownership 14.079 0.001 0.401
Choosership * outcome 0.096 0.76 0.005
Ownership * outcome 4.526 0.045 0.177
Choosership * ownership* outcome 0.427 0.521 0.020
Then we performed analysis for the self-chosen stocks (SC)
and other-chosen stocks (OC) separately. For the SC stocks, a
2 (stock owner: self, other) × 2 (stock outcome: gain, loss) ×
10 (electrode: F3, F4, FC1, FC2, Fz, Cz, C3, C4, CP1, and CP2)
repeated ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of valence
(stock outcome), which indicated that the mean amplitude of the
FRN across loss trials (0.61 ± 2.34µV) had a more negative-
going than across gain trials (2.25 ± 2.35µV), F(1, 21) = 22.00,
p < 0.001, η2 partial= 0.512. Additionally, a two-way interaction
between ownership and valence (stock outcome) approached
significance, F(1, 21) = 13.68, p = 0.001, η
2 partial = 0.394,
suggesting that the gain–loss effect was inconsistent between the
two different owners (self, other). That is, the pattern of brain
responses to a gain vs. loss outcome of self-chosen stocks was
modulated by ownership. The electrode did not significantly
interact with ownership [F(1, 21) < 2.00].
Simple tests were conducted for each of the two owners. For
the SCSO stocks, the loss outcome (1.04 ± 2.45µV) evoked
more negative-going responses than the gain outcome (2.09 ±
2.32µV), F(1, 21) = 7.80, p = 0.011, η
2 partial = 0.271. This
is consistent with previous findings that reflect the violation of
expectation to outcomes. Importantly, for the SCOO stocks, this
pattern was also significant, such that the loss outcome (0.18 ±
2.23µV) evoked more negative-going responses than the gain
outcome (2.41 ± 2.57µV), F(1, 21) = 32.15, p < 0.001, η
2 partial
= 0. 605 (see Figures 2, 5).
FIGURE 4 | Topographic maps for the sustained negativity of d-FRN.
FRN topography in response to the stock outcomes averaged over all subjects
when playing four financial roles. Prefrontal lobe electrodes, including F3, F4,
FC1, FC2, Fz, Cz, C3, C4, CP1, and CP2, had the largest FRN negative-going
amplitudes.
Moreover, we focused on FRN difference (d-FRN) waves
calculated by the brain responses evoked by the falling stock
minus the brain responses evoked by the rising stock. For the
difference of the waves of the FRN amplitude in SC stocks, a
2 (stock owner: self, other) × 10 (electrode: F3, F4, FC1, FC2,
Fz, Cz, C3, C4, CP1, and CP2) ANOVA revealed that the main
effect of stock owner was significant, F(1, 21) = 13.68, p = 0.001,
η2 partial = 0.528, such that the d-FRN to the SCOO stocks
(−2.23± 1.84 µV) was marginally larger compared to the SCSO
stocks (−1.04 ± 1.75 µV). The interaction between ownership
and the electrode did not reach statistical significance, F(1, 21) <
1.00 (see Figures 6, 7).
For the OC stocks, a 2 (stock owner: self, other) × 2 (stock
outcome: gain, loss)× 10 (electrode: F3, F4, FC1, FC2, Fz, Cz, C3,
C4, CP1, and CP2) repeated ANOVA was conducted, The main
effect of valence (stock outcome) was significant, F(1, 21) = 4.78,
p = 0.04, η2 partial= 0.186. No other interaction was significant
[F(1, 21) < 2.3].
A post-hoc pairwise comparison with Bonferroni correction
showed that the FRN amplitude difference between the gain and
loss outcomes of OCSO stocks was significant, F(1, 21) = 8.55,
p = 0.008, η2 partial= 0.289, the loss outcome (0.88± 2.19µV)
evoked more negative-going responses than the gain outcome
(1.69± 2.46µV). While the difference between the gain and loss
outcomes of OCOO stocks was not significant [F(1, 21) = 0.24,
p= 0.63; see Figures 2, 5].
In terms of the d-FRN’s statistical analysis from the other-
chosen stocks, a 2 (stock owner: self, other) × 10 (electrode: F3,
F4, FC1, FC2, Fz, Cz, C3, C4, CP1, and CP2) ANOVA produced
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a marginally significant main effect of ownership, F(1, 21) =
3.65, p = 0.07, η2 partial = 0.148. The d-FRN to the OCSO
stocks (0.88 ± 2.19µV) was more negative-going than the d-
FRN to the OCOO stocks (1.69 ± 2.46µV). Neither the main
effect of the electrode nor the interaction between ownership and
FIGURE 5 | Means of the amplitude of the FRN of the selected
electrodes for ERP statistics of the stock outcome (gains and losses)
when playing the four different financial roles. The error bars denote 1 SE
across subjects for each condition.
the electrode reached statistical significance, both p > 0.05 (see
Figures 6, 7).
The second part of analysis was conducted for the brain
responses to the self-owned (SO) and other-owned stocks (OO)
separately.
For the SO stocks, a 2 (stock chooser: self, other) × 2 (stock
outcome: gain, loss)× 10 (electrode: F3, F4, FC1, FC2, Fz, Cz, C3,
C4, CP1, and CP2) repeated ANOVA revealed a significant main
effect of valence (stock outcome), which indicated that the mean
amplitude of the FRN across loss trials (0.96 ± 2.32µV) was
more negative-going than that across gain trials (1.88± 2.39µV),
F(1, 21) = 10.65, p = 0.04, η
2 partial = 0.337. The results did not
demonstrate the main effect of the stock chooser, F(1, 21) = 1.06,
p = 0.31, η2 partial= 0.048. No other interaction was significant
[F(1, 21) < 1.5].
For the d-FRN amplitude of self-owned stocks (SO), an
ANOVA of 2 (stock chooser: self, other) × 10 (electrode: F3, F4,
FC1, FC2, Fz, Cz, C3, C4, CP1, and CP2) revealed that the main
effect of the stock chooser was not significant, F(1, 21) = 0.52,
p = 0.48, η2 partial = 0.024. Neither the main effect of the
electrode nor the interaction between the stock chooser and the
electrode reached statistical significance, both F(1, 21) < 1.00 (see
Figures 6, 7).
FIGURE 6 | The FRN difference waveform comparison among conditions playing different financial roles from channel Fz, Cz, F3, F4.
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FIGURE 7 | Mean d-FRN amplitudes of the selected electrodes for
ERP statistics for each of the conditions when playing the four
different financial roles. The error bars denote 1 SE across subjects for
each condition.
For the other-owned stocks (OO), 2 (stock chooser: self, other)
× 2 (stock outcome: gain, loss) × 10 (electrode: F3, F4, FC1,
FC2, Fz, Cz, C3, C4, CP1, and CP2) repeated ANOVA revealed a
significant main effect of valence, which indicated that the mean
amplitude of the FRN across the loss trials (0.98 ± 2.15µV) was
more negative-going than across the gain trials (2.16± 2.69µV),
F(1, 21) = 20.50, p < 0.001, η
2 partial = 0.494. The main effect
of the stock chooser was marginally significant, F(1, 21) = 4.219,
p = 0.053, η2 partial = 0.167. The two-way interaction between
stock chooser and valence was significant, F(1, 21) = 22.78,
p < 0.001, η2 partial = 0.52. The electrode did not significantly
interact with any of the experimental variables [F(1, 21) < 2.2].
In terms of the d-FRN’s statistical analysis with OO stocks, an
ANOVA of 2 (stock chooser: self, other) × 10 (electrode: F3, F4,
FC1, FC2, Fz, Cz, C3, C4, CP1, and CP2) showed a significant
main effect of the stock chooser, F(1, 21) = 22.78, p < 0.001, η
2
partial = 0.52. Neither the main effect of the electrode nor the
interaction between the stock chooser and the electrode reached
statistical significance, both p> 0.05 (see Figures 6, 7).
The third part of the analysis analyzed FRN for gains and
also for losses separately. We averaged the above 10 sites and
conducted a two way ANOVA of 2 (stock chooser: self, other) ×
2 (stock owner: self, other) on the FRN evoked by stock increase.
No significant effect was found, ps > 0.05 (see Table 2).
As the simple tests shown in Table 3 reveal, the FRN to SCSO
stocks increase (2.08 ± 2.32µV) was not significantly different
from that to SCOO stocks (2.40 ± 2.57µV); the FRN to OCSO
stocks increase (1.68 ± 2.46µV) was not significantly different
from that to OCOO stocks increase (1.91 ± 2.81µV); the FRN
to SCSO stocks increase (2.08 ± 2.32µV) was not significantly
different from that to OCSO stocks increase (1.68 ± 2.46µV);
the FRN to SCOO stocks increase (2.40 ± 2.57µV) was not
significantly different from that to OCOO stocks increase (1.91
± 2.81µV).
A two way ANOVA of 2 (stock chooser: self, other)× 2 (stock
owner: self, other) on the FRN evoked by stock decrease showed
that a main effect of choosership was significant (shown in
Table 4). The FRN evoked by self-chosen stocks decrease (0.614
TABLE 2 | The ANOVA for FRN evoked by stock increase.
F p η2 partial
Choosership 3.342 0.082 0.137
Ownership 1.534 0.229 0.068
Choosership * ownership 0.025 0.875 0.001
TABLE 3 | Simple tests for FRN evoked by stock increase.
F p η2 partial
SCSO vs. SCOO 1.29 0.26 0.058
OCSO vs. OCOO 0.30 0.585 0.014
SCSO vs. OCSO 1.78 0.197 0.078
SCOO vs. OCOO 1.33 0.262 0.06
TABLE 4 | The ANOVA for FRN evoked by stock decrease.
F p η2 partial
Choosership 18.57 0.000 0.469
Ownership 0.024 0.879 0.001
Choosership * ownership 13.20 0.002 0.386
± 2.34µV) was more negative going than other-chosen stocks
decrease (1.331 ± 2.13µV). The interaction of choosership and
ownership was significant (showed in Table 4). Simple tests
showed that SCOO stocks decrease evoked more negative-going
FRN (0.183± 2.23µV) than SCSO stocks decrease evoked (1.045
± 1.75µV) in a significant level (showed as SCSO vs. SCOO
in Table 5). OCSO stocks decrease evoked more negative-going
FRN (0.882 ± 2.19µV) than OCOO stocks decrease evoked
(1.779 ± 2.08µV) in a significant level (showed as OCSO vs.
OCOO in Table 5).
The FRN evoked by SCSO stocks decrease (1.045 ± 1.75µV)
was not significantly different from that by OCSO stocks decrease
(0.882 ± 2.19µV) (showed as SCSO vs. OCSO in Table 5).
SCOO stocks decrease evoked more negative-going FRN (0.183
± 2.23µV) than OCOO stocks decrease (1.779 ± 2.08µV) at a
significant level (showed as SCOO vs. OCOO in Table 5).
Subjective Rating and Association with the
ERPs
We collected post-recording questionnaires and performed
a correlation analysis between the d-FRN amplitude and
the big-five personality factors (Extraversion, Agreeableness,
Conscientiousness, Emotional stability, and Openness).
The coefficient alpha was 0.79 for Extraversion of the
Big Five Personality, 0.88 for Agreeableness, 0.86 for
Conscientiousness, 0.90 for Emotional Stability, and 0.83 for
Openness.
A reliable negative correlation was observed between the
difference waves of the FRN elicited by SCOO stocks and the
participants’ subjective rating of conscientiousness from the Five-
Factor Model, r=−0.482, p= 0.023. However, the scores on the
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TABLE 5 | Simple tests for FRN evoked by stock decrease.
F p η2 partial
SCSO vs. SCOO 12.24 0.002 0.368
OCSO vs. OCOO 9.97 0.005 0.322
SCSO vs. OCSO 0.234 0.634 0.011
SCOO vs. OCOO 43.58 0.000 0.675
trait of conscientiousness showed no significant correlation with
the d-FRN evoked by the SCSO stocks (r= 0.147, p= 0.513), the
d-FRN evoked by OCSO stocks (r =−0.149, p = 0.507), and the
d-FRN evoked by OCOO stocks (r = −0.332, p = 0.132). Those
results showed that people with higher levels of conscientiousness
had a greater elicited FRN discrepancy between losses and gains
from SCOO stocks, reflecting their sensitivity to others’ losses
and gains. No other significant correlations were found among
the other four personality traits and the d-FRN amplitude in the
four person-stock relationships. Additionally, the correlations
between the perspective-taking scores and the d-FRN amplitude
did not reach a significant level for the SCSO stocks (r=−0.027,
p = 0.906), the SCOO stocks (r = −0.162, p = −0.472), the
OCSO stocks (r = 0.046, p = 0.839), and the OCOO stocks
(r= 0.204, p= 0.303).
DISCUSSION
Using a new experimental paradigm, we manipulated four
person-stock financial relationships to investigate the individual
and interactive influences of perceived ownership and
perceived choosership on stock outcome evaluation, which
were reflected by neural responses. The results revealed
that the ERP component FRN varied when individuals
assumed different financial roles. This provides a more
comprehensive picture of how our evaluations function
when facing gains and losses belonging to ourselves and to
others in large-scale financial markets. By doing so, we can
explore the feature of human social emotions in monetary
activities.
Results of response time analyses showed that the responses
to gains were significantly faster than responses to losses. Results
of brain potentials showed that FRN elicited by stock losses was
larger than that elicited by stock gains. These results indicated
that compared with stock gains, stocks losses seem to be of
expectation violation which evoked more salient FRN at the
brain level and increased peoples’ reaction times at the behavioral
level. Despite this relationship between the overall patterns in
the behavioral and the brain responses to losses and gains, the
brain responses were not significantly different between self-
owned stocks (SO) and other-owned stocks (OO) while the
reaction times were faster to SO than to OO stocks. However,
in self-chosen stocks, people responded slower to SCOO stocks
than SCSO stocks, and d-FRN was larger to SCOO stocks than
SCSO stocks. Hence, FRN revealed sensitivity to losses and
gains, while reaction time showed sensitivity to the ownership
(SO vs. OO).
The FRN Effects in the Four Comparison
Group
Reversed Ownership Effect in Self-chosen Stocks:
Comparison between SCSO vs. SCOO
Electro-physiologically, participants displayed a statistically
significant trend toward more negative FRN when observing
losses than when observing gains of SCSO stocks. The trend
indicated the presence of the FRN effect, that is, the d-FRN
discrepancy (the difference wave between gains and losses). The
reinforcement theory (Holroyd and Coles, 2002; Nieuwenhuis
et al., 2004) suggests that the discrepancy between the actual
outcomes and the expected outcomes signal the activity of a
reinforcement learning system that continually evaluates ongoing
events against the expected outcomes (Holroyd and Coles,
2002). The unexpected outcomes (stock decreases) elicited more
significantly negative ERP responses than the expected outcomes
(stock increases), reflecting the detection of an expectancy
violation.
A surprising finding was that participants had more
significantly negative FRN patterns when observing the losses
than the gains of SCOO stocks, showing an expectancy
violation for others’ losses. This mimics the agent role.
When assuming the role of an agent, the stock chooser (the
agent) may show a guilty response to the stock owner’s (the
client’s) losses. This result is in line with the hypothesis that
FRN is a reflection of the motivational/affective impact of
outcome events (Gehring and Willoughby, 2002; Yeung et al.,
2005). Given that other-regarding responsibility induces guilt
when a negative consequence is due to a fault of the self
(Bell, 1982; Loomes and Sugden, 1982; Epstude and Roese,
2008; Yu and Zhou, 2009), it is possible that the chooser’s
conscientiousness trait induced a guilt response when stocks
decreased.
The scenario of SCOO stocks was used to mimic the
agent-client contract relationship. The economic actors (the
agent and his/her client) develop contractual arrangements in
the agency relationship, where each of the parties executes
the legal obligations assigned to them. The agent takes
charge of the transaction of the financial products for his/her
client. Analogously, we argue that the participants’ sense of
responsibility to their clients was elicited when they were
playing the agent role. In this scenario, guilt responses may
be induced when seeing the client’s loss. The correlation
between questionnaire data and ERP data showed that trait
conscientiousness of the chooser (the agent) was positively
correlated with the d-FRN discrepancy elicited by the client’s
stocks, suggesting that participants high on conscientious were
more likely to perceive clients’ financial problems as unexpected
negative events.
A similar study (Li et al., 2010) also demonstrated the effect
of the personal responsibility on the outcome evaluative process
in the self-regarding approach, with evidence that people high
on personal responsibility had larger FRN effects for the SCOO
outcomes in a gambling game.
Additionally, aside from the conscientiousness point of view,
the reputation of one’s decision-making may also affect the
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evaluation. The decision reputation of transactions for clients
is very important for the agent, because clients may judge
transaction results. According to the self-enhancement theory
(McCrea and Hirt, 2001), people over-evaluate things related
to themselves. For instance, they tend to think highly of their
reputation and try tomaintain a positive self-image in others’ eyes
(Beggan, 1992). As our findings indicate, the agents had positive
expectations for the stock outcomes of their clients. Agents may
feel ashamed when observing clients’ losses because the losses can
be seen as a threat to their own reputation.
Moreover, existing studies showed that the participant (the
observer)’s FRN patterns reflected an empathic response to the
other (the performer) in a social context (Fukushima and Hiraki,
2009; Ma et al., 2011), and the magnitude of the observer’s
FRN varied depending on the social distance between the
performer and the observer (Fukushima and Hiraki, 2009).
Our result is inconsistent with these previous findings. We
found that people showed a larger FRN to those of a further
social distance (SCOO) than those of a closer social distance
(SCSO). Taken into consideration, the absence of significant
correlations between perspective taking scores and the d-FRN
amplitude of the SCOO stocks, we infer that the profit-based
social distance between the agent and the client in the financial
context is different from the familiarity between the “self ” and the
“other” in social contexts (e.g., friendship). This suggests that the
“financial context” in our setting may not overlap with the “social
context.”
Taken together, in the comparison Group One, people feel
bad about both their own losses and others’ losses. Although,
humans are self-interested to some extent (Ma et al., 2011), they
are also social creatures and exhibit consideration for others in
social situations (Fehr and Camerer, 2007). This is consistent
with the trend in neuroeconomics to refute the notion from
traditional economics that people generally maximize their self-
interest (Yeung and Sanfey, 2004; Hajcak et al., 2005, 2007; Sato
et al., 2005; Toyomaki and Murohashi, 2005; Fehr and Camerer,
2007; Yu et al., 2007). Responsibility for others and self-related
reputation may be two possible reasons for why people show
other-regarding preferences in a financial context when the self
is involved in the choosership. This argument is consistent with
the literature in the effect of self-determination (Zuckerman et al.,
1978).
As for evaluation comparison, ownership modulated the
d-FRN effect. When participants assumed the buyer and agent
roles, SCOO stock outcomes evoked a significantly larger d-
FRN discrepancy than SCSO stocks outcomes, indicating that
participants have more positive expectations toward other-
owned outcomes than self-owned outcomes. In terms of
unfavorable outcomes, a much higher expectancy violation to
SCOO stocks losses than SCSO stocks losses was reflected by
a larger FRN, while the FRN patterns elicited by gains were
not significantly different. It seems that concern for others was
stronger than self-regarding concerns when the chooser was
the self. We infer that the other-regarding approach, which is
induced by responsibility for others and self-related reputation,
may be more dominant than the self-interested approach in
a financial context. This intriguing finding was surprisingly
contradictory to the ownership effect (Beggan, 1992), indicating a
“reversed ownership effect,” which overshadowed the choosership
effect.
We deduced that when participants confronted losses of their
own and their clients, instead of adopting a selfish approach, the
participants strengthened their responsibility toward the other
and thus exhibited selfless behaviors, making them even more
sensitive to the others’ losses than to their own. If this is the case,
interpersonal responsibility might be a more dominant feature
of human beings than selfishness in the agency relationship,
which in turn might ultimately be self-benefitting through the
maintenance of a good reputation.
Ownership Effect in Other-Chosen Stocks:
Comparison between OCSO vs. OCOO
As for the comparison in the comparison Group Two, the
results showed that ownership modulated the d-FRN effect:
the d-FRN discrepancy was significant for the OCSO stock
outcome evaluations but not for the OCOO outcome evaluations.
When the chooser was the other, participants tended to have
more positive expectations for self-owned stock outcomes than
for other-owned stock outcomes, demonstrating the ownership
effect (Beggan, 1992). It seems that people tend to prefer self-
profit from stocks to non-self-profit regarding the stocks of others
when they were not involved in the stock choosing process.
Participants exhibited no statistically significant FRN
discrepancy between losses and gains when observing OCOO
stock outcomes, indicating no sympathetic reactions toward
strangers. This finding replicates results from previous neuro-
economic laboratory studies that have revealed an indifferent
attitude (i.e., no empathy) or even derogation of others when
observing strangers’ losses (Fukushima and Hiraki, 2006; Ma
et al., 2011).
Choosership Effect Disappeared in the Self-owned
Stocks: Comparison between SCSO vs. OCSO
The d-FRN elicited by SCSO stock outcomes was not significantly
different from that elicited by OCSO stock outcomes, suggesting
that whether the chooser was the self or the other had little
influence when the participant was the owner. This ERP data
indicated that the choosership effect was overshadowed by the
ownership effect. However, this finding is inconsistent with a
previous object evaluation study (Huang et al., 2009), in which
the choosership effect prevailed over the ownership effect on the
subjects’ preferences. A possible explanation for this inconsistent
finding might be attribution. General objects, such as the cups
or pens in Huang et al.’s (2009) study, were worth much less
than financial products and referred to indirect monetary profit.
It has been well-documented that people’s evaluations would
significantly vary across different amount of monetary values
(Slonim and Roth, 1998; Wu and Zhou, 2009; Wei et al., 2015).
For example, Slonim and Roth (1998) observed that players
reduced the amount of their offers when the stakes were high
in an ultimatum game but did not change their offers when
the stakes were low. Such findings suggest that the quantity of
outcomes plays some role in determining subjective responses
to outcomes. As the outcome evaluation could be reflected in
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the FRN component, Wu and Zhou (2009), found that FRN is
sensitive to the magnitude of reward feedback, with a larger d-
FRN response to a larger reward than to a smaller reward. As
objects are less valuable possessions, ownership does not affect
object evaluation verymuch. In this condition, choosership could
have an effect on object evaluations when objects are owned by
the self. Different from evaluations of general objects, stocks, as
a typical financial product, are closely related to monetary profit.
Financial markets are quite different from routine items because
the quantity of money involved in stockmarkets is very large. The
outcome of stocks, even a small percentage of gain or loss, usually
involves a large amount of monetary value change. People are
thus more concerned about self-owned stocks’ profits, regardless
of whether they are self-chosen stocks or not. Given the relatively
large monetary profit in the financial market, ownership tends to
overshadow the choosership effect.
Choosership Effect in the Other-Owned Stocks:
Comparison between SCOO vs. OCOO
When the owner was the other, the self-chosen stock outcomes
elicited a significantly larger d-FRN than the other-chosen
stock outcomes, demonstrating a stronger positive expectation
(see Figure 7). This implied a choosership effect even when
participants do not own the stocks. Previous research on self-
enhancement revealed that people overvalue self-related aspects
(Kurman and Kurman, 2001). A choosership effect was induced
by the overvaluation of the self-concept in self-chosen stocks.
That is, individuals still prefer the stocks that they select when
they do not own those stocks, and the choosership effect has a
neural basis, as presented in the current literature.
Implications and Limitations
Our finding is the first to show that in a financial context,
the agent’s FRN is more negative toward a client’s losses than
toward the agent’s own losses (see Figure 7), reflecting a higher
expectation for self-chosen-other-owned stock outcomes. This
provides a deeper understanding of the reinforcement theory that
expectancy violation is affected by financial contexts. Although
previous researchers have provided evidence to show that that
people are not merely self-regarding in traditional economics
(Yeung and Sanfey, 2004; Hajcak et al., 2005, 2007; Sato et al.,
2005; Toyomaki and Murohashi, 2005), the comparison of
the self-regarding and other-regarding approach has seldom
been investigated. Our results provide direct comparison
evidence that, when both the other-regarding and self-regarding
approaches exist, humans may behave more altruistically than
selfishly under particular circumstances where choosership and
responsibility are involved.
The social distance between the “self ” and the “other” was
manipulated by different financial relationships in our paradigm.
We decomposed the financial relationship into the owner role
and the chooser role in the current study. Compared with
previously used empirical economic situations (e.g., gamble
games), our paradigm seems to be more relevant to the real
world stock market that is the aggregation of buyers and sellers
(a loose network of economic transactions, not a physical facility,
or discrete entity) of stocks and imagined stock trade actions.
The outcome of stocks, even a small percentage of gain or loss,
usually involves a large amount of monetary value change, which
is different from the relatively small amount of cash reward (e.g.,
several dollars or even cents) in traditional gambling games. The
financial relationships between the “self ” and the “other” in our
study was assigned to anonymous unacquainted strangers and
then primed by our experimental scenario. Participants in the
simulated stock market were assigned different financial roles
that included buyers of stocks for oneself (similar to those buying
stocks for themselves and individual retail investors), buyers of
stocks for others (similar to brokers), those who delegate others
to buy stocks on their behalf (similar to those who buy funds),
and those who simply observe others buying and selling stocks.
We set up four roles according to perceived ownership and
choosership, which helped to examine the neural foundation of
complex human cognitive and emotional reactions to gains and
losses in financial activities. This design is particularly useful for
investigating responsibility, selfishness, and altruism in a more
comparable setting.
The current study has a practical implication as well. This
study mimics a financial agent in a real stock market. Results
suggested the “agent” might feel more discomfort toward the
client’s loss than to the agent’s own loss. This pattern of EEG/FRN
results implies that people who work as stock brokers and fund
managers, which, as high-paying careers, might be especially
susceptible to tremendous pressure induced by the responsibility
for others’ outcomes. Our findings shed new light into the
recruitment and training of these professionals.
The current study may have certain limitations that can
be addressed in future research. First, although we measured
the conscientious trait to represent responsibility, we only
established the relationship between personality trait and d-FRN
data. This is not a robust evidence to support that responsibility
may result in a large d-FRN in the self-chosen-other-owned
condition, and such causality needs to be further tested. Second,
we did not directly measure individuals’ self-reputation concerns.
Third, we did not measure online emotional reactions related
to the outcomes, such as guilt. Future research is needed to
confirm the emotions that we speculated in this study. Fourth,
we used an imaginary scenario and did not include actual
stock investment actions. The ecological validity was limited
and we did not have evidence to support our paradigm’s
validity. However, although we did not provide evidence that
our paradigm was able to represent the large monetary scale
of financial markets, it represents an important step to try
to mimic the complicated financial market. Future research
could examine the current findings among actual stockholders
or fund managers in the real world to increase the external
validity.
Additionally, although we used M-sequence to balance the
sequence effect between all eight conditions, the sequence of
ratios (3, 6, 9%) was presented randomly, which may induce a
negligible history effect. We could not fully exclude the possible
sequence effect of different ratios for sure. Finally, we did not
separate different ratios of price change (3 vs. 9%) because the
number of trials for each ratio was not enough for ERP analysis
in our design. We only recorded the increase or decrease of price
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change. Theremay be a value size effect between 3 and 9%. Future
studies could study the size effect on outcome evaluation in the
four financial scenarios.
In conclusion, by recording participants’ neural and
behavioral reactions to stock outcomes, the present study
investigated the neural mechanism of how financial contextual
factors affect outcome evaluations, reflected by amplitudes
of tFRN, in a stock observation task. We found a “reversed
ownership effect” for the self-chosen stocks (comparison
group One) and the ownership effect in other chosen stocks
(comparison Group Two). The choosership effect disappeared
under the influence of the perceived ownership (self-owned
stocks, comparison Group Three), whereas the choosership
effect was robust for other-owned stocks (comparison Group
Four). Our findings refute the hypothesis from traditional
economics that people only act to maximize their self-interest
and provides concrete neural evidence showing that people are
social creatures and can be other-regarding in financial situations
(Fehr and Camerer, 2007). While we admit that people are
self-interested to a certain extent, at least in certain contexts,
altruism prevails over self-regard in the agency relationship.
In addition, the research paradigm reported here provides a
useful experimental pattern that helps to explain human nature
by comparing the neural underpinnings of human financial
behaviors. These results are particularly relevant to a new
research area that we call social neuro finance.
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